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REPLY
Rhetoric and Reality in Early American Legal History:
A Reply to Gordon Wood
Alison L. LaCroix†
INTRODUCTION
I thank Gordon Wood for his substantive engagement with the
arguments in my book, and I welcome the opportunity to exchange views
on these major historical and historiographical issues with one of the most
important living US historians. There are many places in which we agree,
although these might be obscured by the sharp tone of his review. But there
are also many points on which we disagree, and I am eager to address those
issues.
Wood misstates the main argument of my book. My claim, in its
strongest form, is that the debates of the 1760s through the 1780s
culminated in a new constitutionalization of federalism, a process that
continued into the 1800s. From a disconnected and sometimes ambiguous
set of arguments about divided sovereignty in politics, American colonists
and early republicans fashioned a new architecture of legal and
constitutional authority built on a subject-matter division of governmental
power. In contrast to earlier systems—whether formal or informal—of
polycentric government, the federalism of the late eighteenth- and early
nineteenth-century United States was specifically designed to avoid the
ancient problem of imperium in imperio, or dominion within a dominion,
that had so troubled the British Atlantic political world for decades. The
significant innovation of the American federal idea was to authorize the
division of sovereignty and to create viable legal categories that could
contain multiple sources of governmental power within one overarching
system.1

†

Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School.
I thank David Armitage, William Birdthistle, Adam Cox, Christine Desan, Morton Horwitz, James
Kloppenberg, Martha Nussbaum, Lior Strahilevitz, and David Strauss for helpful discussions. I also
thank the Mayer Brown Faculty Research Fund for research support.
1
See Alison L. LaCroix, The Ideological Origins of American Federalism 8–10, 133–35, 178–79
(Harvard 2010).
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The intellectual energy of American political and legal thinkers
between 1780 and 1800 was thus devoted to a project of translation
between political debates and constitutional structure. These statesmen and
theorists sought to translate the political conditions of multiple
governmental authorities that the colonists had both experienced and
theorized under the British Empire into a constitutional structure. This
constitutional structure would, they believed, not simply conform to
orthodox imperial legal theory through a series of workarounds or legal
fictions, but would instead reshape some basic premises of that orthodoxy
by rejecting unitary sovereignty in favor of a deep-seated commitment to
multiple sources of sovereignty.
In this project of translation, federal theorists such as John Dickinson,
John Adams, James Madison, James Wilson, Alexander Hamilton, John
Marshall, and others joined experience and theory into a new constellation
of operative legal categories. The new constitutional structure celebrated its
multiplicity, with the text of the Constitution beating an insistent refrain of
overlap, duality, and tension between the states and the general government.
The founding document, which both ratified and created the new frame of
government, outlined a novel scheme of authority in which the subject of
governmental action, not only the actor itself, was the relevant focus for
determining legality. Hence the attention to specific categories of subject
matter for governmental action: “commerce,” “taxation,” “treaties,
alliances, and confederations.” The new republic would escape the
imperium in imperio trap by apportioning the powers of government—the
subject matters of jurisdiction—between the state and general levels of
government. Building on the colonial distinction between internal and
external regulation, these thinkers moved beyond previous decades’
obsession with identifying a single proper source of political sovereignty
and instead reframed the debate around an ideological commitment to a
new federal structure, the principal mission of which was to draw the line
between the regulatory power of the states and that of the general
government while endorsing the importance of each as a distinct sphere of
authority.2
The localism that Wood insists was central to instilling the colonists
with proto-federal beliefs was but one part of a larger, multilayered
architecture of governmental authority. Rather than a period in which longestablished colonial practices of town and county autonomy were recast as
popular sovereignty in order to be slotted into an existing “logic of
sovereignty,”3 my claim is that the 1770s and 1780s were a time of intense

2
3

(2011).

See id at 41–44.
Gordon S. Wood, Book Review, Federalism from the Bottom Up, 78 U Chi L Rev 705, 722
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creativity in American constitutional thought. It was not the case that
American theorists spent these decades with the ultimate goal of satisfying
William Blackstone’s theory of unitary sovereignty and that a byproduct of
those efforts was a system that only later became preoccupied with the
division between sovereigns. The system that they designed was in fact
preoccupied with precisely this division.
A view that focuses entirely on unitary sovereignty in this way risks
becoming a functionalist account of how political and legal ideas emerge:
the Founders’ radicalism did not extend to challenging the post–Glorious
Revolution orthodoxy of parliamentary sovereignty, so they needed to find
a unitary sovereign, so they cast around, found the ideas of popular
sovereignty that had been present in Anglo-American political thought
since at least the early seventeenth century, and thereby solved the problem
of imperium in imperio. But arguments from necessity (people needed a
certain idea, so they invented that idea) are an odd version of intellectual
history, especially from a scholar widely recognized as one of the leading
proponents of a form of history that takes ideas seriously.4
My contention is that the Founders rejected the premise of
Blackstonian unitary sovereignty, and that their and their colonial forebears’
experience with local self-governance was only a part of their broader
and—as the debates of the 1760s and 1770s revealed—highly unorthodox
vision of governmental authority as capable of division according to the
activities, persons, or objects being regulated.5 American federal theorists
believed that as long as the various imperia were demarcated as the specific
domains of either federal or state power (treaties, customs duties, and
commerce among the states on the one hand; appointment of presidential
electors, selection of US senators, and general police powers on the other),
they did not present the type of threat that had so worried Blackstone and
theorists such as colonial undersecretary William Knox. The members of
the Founding generation viewed their task as accommodating the multiple
authorities under which they and their predecessors had lived: the town
meeting, the county court, the colony and state, and the imperial and
general governments. They therefore understood their task not to be coming
to terms with Blackstone’s unitary sovereignty but creating a new
conception of governmental structure that would both make sense of their

4
See, for example, Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787 viii
(North Carolina 1998) (“In essence, republicanism was the ideology of the Enlightenment.”). Consider
Drew R. McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America 8 (North Carolina
1980) (citing Wood, along with Bernard Bailyn and J.G.A. Pocock, as setting a scholarly agenda that
treats “‘republicanism’ as a distinctive universe (or ‘paradigm’) of thought and discourse that gave
shape to contemporary perceptions of the American Revolution”).
5
LaCroix, Ideological Origins at 126 (cited in note 1).
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own experience and rise to the level of the English, Scottish, and
Continental political theory that they had long studied.6
Wood and I disagree about several important elements of Revolutionary
and early republican political and legal theory—in particular, and as I
discuss below, the relationships between law and social practice and between
ideas and experience. These are scholarly disagreements, and they are
important. Yet our accounts are not incompatible, despite the apparent
determination to find disagreement that Wood’s review displays.
I. FACTS
Before addressing the substantive issues on which Wood and I
disagree, I must first correct some mistaken assertions in his review. As I
will demonstrate, many of the asserted missing pieces are in fact covered in
the book. A few other issues are not discussed in the text because they are
not, in my view, relevant to the story of federalism’s development.
First, Wood states that my book “never acknowledges that the
American colonists from the very beginning of their settlements in the
seventeenth century were thoroughly familiar with the dividing and
apportioning of political power.”7 In fact, Chapter 1 of the book begins by
noting that many of the antecedents of eighteenth-century federal thought
dated from seventeenth-century Anglo-American constitutional debates.8
Page 12 contains the following observation: “The lived constitutional
experience of many colonists involved multiple lawmaking bodies. For
many North Americans, the most significant laws touching everyday
activities emanated from their towns or colonial assemblies, not from
Parliament or the Privy Council.”9 Wood’s assertion is simply incorrect.
Indeed, I agree—although perhaps not violently enough for Wood’s taste, as
in my discussion of the Iroquois Confederacy—that the colonists’
experience of divided authority was essential for the development of federal
thought.
Second, in another mischaracterization of my argument, Wood
maintains that “[a]lthough LaCroix mentions the New England
Confederation, she never explains its background. Indeed, she never
acknowledges that the idea of parceling out authority from the bottom up—
creating different levels of government—was very much a part of American

6
For a persuasive argument that scholars’ emphasis on Blackstone’s influence on the Founders
has obscured other sources of legal theory, and that early eighteenth-century Scottish legal thought had
particular importance for the structural provisions of the Constitution, see generally James E. Pfander
and Daniel D. Birk, Article III and the Scottish Judiciary, 124 Harv L Rev 1613 (2011).
7
Wood, 78 U Chi L Rev at 710 (cited in note 3).
8
LaCroix, Ideological Origins at 11 (cited in note 1).
9
Id at 12.
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experience from the beginning.”10 I must confess myself mystified at this
dogged misreading of the book. Pages 20–22 of the book discuss the New
England Confederation of 1643 in some detail, explaining that the drafters
intended the agreement as a “firm and perpetual league of friendship and
amity” for the purposes of “preserving and propagating the truth and
liberties of the Gospel and for their own safety and welfare.”11 As for the
parceling out of authority “from the bottom up,” the book clearly
emphasizes the point that confederations among colonies were premised on
the colonists’ belief that they could themselves legitimately constitute
governmental authority.12
Third, in his lengthy section on representation, which Wood includes
as part of his longer discussion of popular sovereignty (which I treat at
length below13), Wood states that I “ignore[]” the distinctions between actual
and virtual representation.14 While it is true that the book does not explicitly
discuss these theories, it is not the case that they have been ignored. The
representation question was certainly important for many of the actors I
discuss, but I chose to focus on another limiting argument that the colonists
used to cabin Parliament: the distinction between internal, colonial taxes or
legislation and external, empire-wide regulation. Both strategies were
attempts to redefine the power of Parliament—although, as I discuss below,
Wood and I disagree about the range and breadth of possible reforms
available to the colonists. Given his emphasis on local legislative autonomy,
Wood’s focus on representation makes sense, but it is not necessary to my
account of structural multiplicity.
Fourth, Wood states that I “scarcely acknowledge[] the existence of
William Knox’s ministerial pamphlet of 1769 . . . even though it was the
most important statement of the official British position in the entire
period.”15 This is, like many of Wood’s claims, an exaggerated and overly
categorical critique. On pages 52, 63, and 122, and in a footnote on page
243, the book provides several extended quotations from Knox’s pamphlet
and portrays him as one of the major exponents of the metropolitan
perspective on the imperial constitution. Wood would presumably prefer
more discussion of Knox because he believes that, along with Blackstone’s
views on sovereignty, Knox’s theories amounted to orthodoxy that the
colonists had no choice but to adopt. I disagree.
Fifth, although Wood dismisses the Articles of Confederation as
simply an application of long-established local autonomy (“forming the
10
11
12
13
14
15

Wood, 78 U Chi L Rev at 715 (cited in note 3) (citation omitted).
LaCroix, Ideological Origins at 21 (cited in note 1).
Id at 20.
See Part II.A.
Wood, 78 U Chi L Rev at 717 (cited in note 3).
Id at 720.
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Articles of Confederation posed no great theoretical problems”), a few lines
later he nevertheless suggests that my account spends too little time on
them.16 In fact, Chapter 4 contains a detailed discussion of the Articles,
describing their content and situating them in the broader context of
colonial attempts at union dating from the early seventeenth century.
Moreover, had Wood attended to footnote 58 on page 261, he might not
have been so quick to assert that “[s]he does not seem to realize that the
Confederation Congress was merely a replacement for the Crown.”17 That
note contains a lengthy discussion of Jerrilyn Green Marston’s King and
Congress, including the following observation: “Marston argues that the
text vested the Confederation Congress with many of the most important
executive functions for which the Crown had formerly been responsible.”18
Sixth, in a moment of constitutional formalism, Wood states that
“LaCroix never mentions” Article I, § 10 of the Constitution.19 This is an
important omission, he feels, because the delegates to the Constitutional
Convention regarded § 10’s list of prohibitions on state power as “the
replacement for Madison’s veto.”20 As the Convention debates demonstrate,
however, many delegates viewed the Supreme Court’s power of judicial
review as the most important substitute for Madison’s proposal to give
Congress the power to negative state laws. When they discussed Article I,
§ 10, they regarded it as a legislation-focused complement to the
Supremacy Clause’s judicial mechanism of keeping the states in check.21
Wood’s insistence that Article I, § 10, replaced Madison’s negative suggests
that he has conflated the Founders’ debate over the rules by which subject
matter was to be allocated with their institutional debate over how those
rules would be enforced. But it was through their treatment of the
institutional question that the Founders translated their commitment to
multiplicity into a new legal form.
Finally, in the last paragraph of the review, Wood laments that I did not
“dip[] into” any volumes of the ratification debates.22 He grants that the
creation of American federalism “involved a great deal of intellectual
debate” but then warns that “that debate did not take place in the
Constitutional Convention.”23 Few historians of the period would make such
a sweeping, and implausible, claim about the Constitutional Convention.
Moreover, the book contains several references to the ratification debates in
16

Id at 724–25.
Id at 724.
18 LaCroix, Ideological Origins at 261 n 58 (cited in note 1), discussing Jerrilyn Greene Marston,
King and Congress: The Transfer of Political Legitimacy, 1774–1776 205 (Princeton 1987).
19 Wood, 78 U Chi L Rev at 727 (cited in note 3).
20 Id at 726.
21 See LaCroix, Ideological Origins at 163 (cited in note 1).
22 Wood, 78 U Chi L Rev at 732 (cited in note 3).
23 Id.
17
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the form of the Federalist essays, as well as John Marshall’s comments on
the floor of the Virginia convention, when the future chief justice urged his
colleagues to embrace the possibility of a system of inferior federal courts.
Taking up Wood’s suggestion that the “real” intellectual debate did not take
place in the Constitutional Convention, however, I must disagree. Indeed,
given Wood’s insistence on the importance of the ratification debates, his
outright dismissal of the Constitutional Convention is puzzling. In Part II.B,
I discuss the Convention’s retooling of received political philosophy into a
new vision of political authority and finally into a workable legal system—
surely the product of intellectual debate.
Now let us move to more substantive points.
II. SUBSTANTIVE CLAIMS
Although Wood raises a number of issues, I address them under two
broad themes: (1) localism and popular sovereignty, and (2) judicial review
and the Supremacy Clause.
A.

Localism and Popular Sovereignty

The first third of Wood’s review could easily have been titled “The
Triumph of William Blackstone” based on the almost evangelical zeal with
which Wood not only adopts that jurist’s views of sovereignty but also
marshals them against the American Founders to show that they could not
possibly have held any dissenting views of the proper arrangement of
governmental authority. Wood’s critique contains three claims: first, that the
colonists’ dominant political experience centered on “bottom up,” locally
based political autonomy at the level of the town and the county; second,
that this localism was distinct from what he might term the “top down”
exercise of British imperial authority over the colonies, as well as the
“bottom up” resistance from the colonies against metropolitan authority;
and third, that only his species of localism is significant for the
development of federalism. This localism, he argues, stemmed from
centuries of the “long English heritage of local autonomy” and came to
fruition in the Founders’ embrace of popular sovereignty as the basis of
American government.24 For Wood, localism was both sufficient and
necessary to bring about federalism. From this view follows the conclusion
that the theoretical shift of the 1780s was a mere formalization of localism
in the form of a fundamental commitment to popular sovereignty.
Federalism, then, was nothing more than the extension of the colonists’
experience of localism, a theoretical fillip to the more important reality of
rule by the people.
24

Id at 711.
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In laying out this view, Wood omits at least half the story of
federalism’s origins. Of course the colonists’ experience with local
autonomy profoundly shaped their political and constitutional worldview by
giving them a deeply ingrained sense of governmental power as susceptible
to the people’s control. Nothing in my book disputes this point, and indeed
the book takes as given the importance of these antecedent ideas of local
control. In my discussion of the early American confederations, I explain
that the articles of confederation among the four colonies of the New
England Confederation of 1643 “did not refer to the Crown, Parliament, or
any other metropolitan authority. The recitation of authority that began the
document referred only to the member colonies and spoke in the language
of Calvinist voluntarism.”25 Assertions of popular sovereignty dating from
the English Civil War clearly undergirded these colonists’ powerful sense of
themselves as possessing the power to establish a government.26
As the book makes clear, the earliest efforts at colonial confederation
took place within the first three decades of English settlement in mainland
North America, and each of these efforts proceeded from the premise that
the colonists themselves possessed the power to enter into leagues with
other colonies. My argument, therefore, emphasizes both the colonists’
belief in the legitimacy of their own locally based constitutional power
(what Wood terms “bottom up” political authority27) and their intuition that
this power could reach outside one’s own colony to form supracolonial
associations with one’s neighbor colonies. This latter point is the logical
extension of a theory of “bottom-up” political authority. It is what happens
when several politically and legally autonomous units join together to
create another level of governmental authority.
But such connections are simply ignored in Wood’s account. Wood’s
strange assertion that the book “never acknowledges that the idea of
parceling out authority from the bottom up—creating different levels of
government—was very much a part of American experience from the
beginning”28 demonstrates this unwillingness to conceive of local political
autonomy as having any outward-looking consequences. Where Wood sees
local political autonomy, therefore, I see local political autonomy as well as
the desire within those localities to form bonds, treaties, leagues, and
confederations with other localities—that is, the desire to experiment with
multiple levels of governmental authority. Colonial legal practice and

25

LaCroix, Ideological Origins at 20–22 (cited in note 1).
See, for example, William Clarke, The Putney Debates (Oct 28, 1647), in C.H Firth, ed, 1 The
Clarke Papers 226, 301 (Camden Society 1891) (quoting Thomas Rainborow, a colonel in Cromwell’s
New Model Army, as saying “every man that is to live under a Governement ought first by his owne
consent to putt himself under that Governement”).
27 Wood, 78 U Chi L Rev at 711 (cited in note 3).
28 Id at 715.
26
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theory were thus much messier than Wood’s account suggests, and
provincial thinkers engaged for decades in efforts to reconcile competing
sources of authority: local law and imperial regulation, ordinary legislation
and higher law.29
Wood baldly asserts that a distinctly and exclusively local species of
authority was the only recognized source of legal and political power in the
early colonial period. “During the first generation of settlement in the New
World, the Crown, which in England was considered the source of all local
authority, for all intents and purposes simply did not exist,” he states.30
Quite the contrary. Consider the opening lines of the Mayflower Compact,
one of the earliest acts of political self-determination by a group of
colonists:
In the Name of God, Amen. We, whose Names are under-written, the
Loyal Subjects of our Dread Soveraign Lord King James. . . . Having
undertaken for the glory of God, and advancement of the Christian
Faith, and the Honour of our K[i]ng and Countrey, a Voyage to plant
the first Colony in the Northern parts of Virginia; Do by these
Presents, solemnly and mutually, in the presence of God and one
another, Covenant and Combine our selves together into a Civil Body
Politick.31
The spirit of local authority, of direct communion between the people
aboard the Mayflower and their God, suffuses this famous founding
document. But that covenant with divine authority (the political equivalent
of Luther’s call for Protestants to interpret biblical text for themselves) was
combined with a direct grant of temporal political authority from James I.
Indeed, the Mayflower separatists’ references to the Stuart king were more
than early modern boilerplate, a throat-clearing exercise at the beginning of
an official document. The compact not only described the Mayflower
passengers as loyal subjects of the monarch, it also listed “the Honour of
our King and Countrey” as one of the motivations for their venture. These
29 The argument that British North Americans consciously engaged in a decades-long effort to
reconcile competing sources of law, especially positivist versus higher-law-based accounts of ultimate
legal authority, received scholarly attention in the middle of the twentieth century and has recently
become the subject of renewed examination by legal historians. For two influential accounts, see Joseph
Henry Smith, Appeals to the Privy Council from the American Plantations 614, 629–35 (Columbia
1950); J.W. Gough, Fundamental Law in English Constitutional History 192–96 (Oxford 1961). For more
recent investigations, see Philip Hamburger, Law and Judicial Duty 31–69, 283–326 (Harvard 2008);
Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Constituting Empire: New York and the Transformation of Constitutionalism in the
Atlantic World, 1664–1830 75–144 (North Carolina 2005); Mary Sarah Bilder, The Transatlantic
Constitution: Colonial Legal Culture and the Empire 186–96 (Harvard 2004). See also R.H. Helmholz,
Bonham’s Case, Judicial Review, and the Law of Nature, 1 J Legal Analysis 325, 331 (2009).
30 Wood, 78 U Chi L Rev at 712 (cited in note 3).
31 Mayflower Compact (1620), reprinted in Donald S. Lutz, ed, Colonial Origins of the American
Constitution: A Documentary History 31, 31–32 (Liberty Fund 1998).
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English settlers claimed the power to combine themselves in a civil body
politic, and they understood that body politic to exist in an ongoing
relationship with Crown, country, and deity.
The emphasis on predicate sources of political and legal power that
was so important for early settlers came to preoccupy many colonists in the
middle of the eighteenth century. At that point, the dual tensions in colonial
legal thought between, first, positive legislation and higher law, and second,
localism and membership in the empire, became manifest. Perhaps no
colonial commentator better illustrates British North Americans’ efforts to
reconcile these competing commitments than James Otis. In a widely
circulated 1764 treatise that laid bare the colonists’ struggle to articulate a
coherent constitutional vision, Otis offered forceful arguments for the
ostensibly incompatible theories of popular sovereignty, parliamentary
sovereignty, natural law, colonial rights, and colonial subjection to
Parliament. “[S]upreme absolute power is originally and ultimately in the
people,” Otis stated.32 This strong endorsement of popular sovereignty was
followed by a robust declaration that took a similar line to that of Otis’s
contemporary, Blackstone: “The power of Parliament is uncontrollable but
by themselves, and we must obey. They only can repeal their own acts.”33
Yet Otis evidently also believed that there were limits to Parliament’s
uncontrollable authority: “The Parliament cannot make 2 and 2, 5:
omnipotency cannot do it.”34 Where did these limits come from? Otis then
argued for a higher-law boundary on parliamentary authority. “There must
be in every instance, a higher authority, viz., GOD. Should an act of
Parliament be against any of his natural laws, which are immutably true,
their declaration would be . . . void.”35 The remedy for any such violations,
however, appeared to lie with the legislature: “and so it would be adjudged
by the Parliament itself when convinced of their mistake.”36 As for the
colonies’ relationship to Parliament, Otis stated that “as over subordinate
governments the Parliament of Great Britain has an undoubted power and
lawful authority to make acts . . . that, by naming them, shall and ought to
be equally binding as upon the subjects of Great Britain within the realm.”37
Along with these duties to Parliament, however, the colonists could claim
“all the natural, essential, inherent, and inseparable rights of our fellow
subjects in Great Britain.”38
32 James Otis, The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved (1764), reprinted in
Bernard Bailyn, ed, 1 Pamphlets of the American Revolution 1750–1776 408, 424 (Belknap 1965)
(emphasis omitted).
33 Id at 448.
34 Id at 454.
35 Id (emphasis omitted).
36 Otis, Rights of the British Colonies at 454 (cited in note 32).
37 Id at 442.
38 Id at 444.
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What is one to make of this welter of apparently conflicting arguments
in Otis’s writings? The principal lesson to be drawn is that while the
experience of local authority and the theory of popular sovereignty were
significant aspects of provincial law and politics, other elements of the
colonists’ experience and thought were at least as important for the
emergence of American federalism. As demonstrated by Otis’s anguished
attempt to cobble together the disparate elements of post–Glorious
Revolution English political theory, higher-law limitations on legislative
power, and the colonists’ experience of local government, British North
Americans clearly felt that their commitment to local political autonomy
did not offer complete answers to some of the most pressing issues of
colonial law and politics. Many colonial commentators therefore brooded
on the preliminary question of establishing the legal legitimacy of the
fledgling colonies as well as the later question of placing mature colonies
with thriving local political institutions within the framework of a larger
empire that was increasingly committed to parliamentary sovereignty.
Here my disagreement with Wood becomes manifest. Wood argues
that the colonies were always federal, and he understands “federal” to mean
a foundation of local political authority.39 The early settlers, he maintains,
“were experiencing federalism without any ideological justification
whatsoever.”40 Because this always-existing federalism was based on
“bottom up” political authority from the people in the towns and counties, it
never presented a challenge to orthodox British political theory’s growing
aversion to imperium in imperio. Indeed, Wood claims, it was precisely this
deep-seated commitment to localism and popular sovereignty that permitted
the colonists—and later the Founders—to satisfy the demands of
Blackstone, Knox, and others for unitary, undivided sovereignty. Unitary
sovereignty was there all along, vested in the people, so at the moment of
crisis, “the people” simply took over from Parliament to become the new
single sovereign in American theory. The colonists, Wood insists repeatedly,
could not “evade the logic of sovereignty” put forth by Blackstone and
Knox; that logic was just too powerful.41 “In the end,” Wood states, the
Massachusetts House of Representatives “accepted the logic of the
Blackstonian idea of sovereignty, which is what all the colonial leaders
eventually did.”42 Indeed, we are told, “[o]ne by one, all of the leading
Revolutionaries—John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, and
Alexander Hamilton—accepted the logic of sovereignty but relocated it in
their separate legislatures.”43
39
40
41
42
43

Wood, 78 U Chi L Rev at 712–13 (cited in note 3).
Id at 713.
Id at 721.
Id at 721–22.
Wood, 78 U Chi L Rev at 723 (cited in note 3).
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“Accepted the logic”? This does not read as the detached analytical
tone of the historian; this is the language of the advocate. With such
locutions as “accepted the logic” and “evade the logic,” Wood suggests that
Blackstone’s and Knox’s arguments were the only acceptable logic, and that
the colonists’ early attempts to resist it were just foolish or misguided. If
Wood’s narrative is based on an unchanging commitment to local autonomy
that, in the form of popular sovereignty, simply took the place of Parliament
and left the rest of British political and legal orthodoxy unchanged, one
wonders whether he believes that anything new emerged from American
thought in the 1770s and 1780s. Was the creation of the American Republic,
1776–1787, really nothing more than the clever recasting of a preexisting
colonial commitment to local governance in order to satisfy a problem of
domestic British political theory? In other words, is Wood taking the
position that the unitary view of sovereignty was the correct one, and
therefore that the colonists must have accepted it in order to avoid being
“wrong on the law”?44
Strangely enough, Wood’s answer to these questions appears to be
yes.45 He rejects arguments that the colonists began in the 1770s to move
away from a belief in unitary sovereignty and toward a theory of multiple
authorities. “They were, of course, doing nothing of the sort,” he states.46
The force of the Blackstonian argument compelled the colonists to relocate
sovereignty to the several colonial legislatures. And lest one think this
represented a change, Wood offers the following: “This was an intellectual
adjustment, not a substantive one, as Americans had usually acted as if their
separate colonial legislatures were miniature parliaments.”47
But in fact an intellectual and a substantive adjustment—a moment of
creativity—was exactly what the colonists were engaged in during the
1770s and 1780s. (Here one must note how odd such a statement is from a
scholar who once criticized “behaviorist historians” for treating ideas as
“merely a covering superstructure for the underlying and determinative
social reality.”48) Wood’s claim that the Blackstone–Knox theory of unitary
sovereignty was both descriptively accurate and the only acceptable

44 See Barbara A. Black, The Constitution of Empire: The Case for the Colonists, 124 U Pa L Rev
1157, 1157–58 (1976) (critiquing inquiries framed in this way).
45 The unwavering belief in a single, correct “logic of sovereignty” that Wood displays in his review
stands in sharp contrast to his previous critiques of scholars whom he viewed as producing “briefs” for the
arguments of actors that they studied. See Gordon S. Wood, Ideology and the Origins of Liberal America,
44 Wm & Mary Q 628, 632–33 (1987) (“It may be a necessary fiction for lawyers and jurists to believe in a
‘correct’ or ‘true’ interpretation of the Constitution in order to carry on their business, but we historians
have different obligations and aims.”).
46 Wood, 78 U Chi L Rev at 722 (cited in note 3).
47 Id.
48 Gordon S. Wood, Rhetoric and Reality in the American Revolution, 23 Wm & Mary Q 3, 8
(1966).
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normative view at the time attributes a totalizing, hegemonic power to their
ideas that is not borne out in the sources. Indeed, Wood’s implication that
Blackstone and Knox were correct—so much so that attempts by the
colonists to refute them amounted to “evad[ing]” their logic or attempting
to “get away with denying Parliament’s authority to tax them”49—risks
running afoul of the fallacy Barbara Black described as “refusing to call a
Revolution a revolution.”50
The colonists did not argue for divided sovereignty, Wood insists,
because they could not. I maintain that the colonists did argue for divided
sovereignty, and that understanding how they managed to do so, and how
they drew that new idea from familiar ideas and experiences, is what ought
to matter to an intellectual historian. Popular sovereignty was certainly part
of the creativity of the period, but the equally significant achievement of
these thinkers lay in their reconception of the relationships among
institutions and governments themselves.
B.

Judicial Review and the Supremacy Clause

In the book, I argue that the debate in the Constitutional Convention—
in particular, the rejection of Madison’s negative and the adoption of
judicial review under the Supremacy Clause and Article III—was a vital
moment for the emergence of American federalism.51 In the course of these
discussions, including Madison’s own research and writing in preparation
for the Convention and the ratification debates, federal thought was
translated from a diffuse array of theories about, and experiences of,
governmental multiplicity to a set of operative legal categories.52 Two
important and related developments during the Convention characterized
this translation: first, an effort to formalize the subject-matter, rather than
functional, division of authority among levels of government that had first
been articulated by the colonists in the 1760s; and second, a shift in
emphasis from legislative to judicial remedies for state misbehavior and
parochialism, which many delegates believed posed the greatest threat to
the confederation.
The subject-matter-based division of governmental authority
underpinned many provisions of the Constitution, in particular Article I, § 8
(setting forth Congress’s enumerated powers) and Article I, § 10 (prohibiting
the states from regulating certain subjects).53 For different reasons, Federalists
such as Alexander Hamilton, Gouverneur Morris, and John Marshall, and

49
50
51
52
53

Wood, 78 U Chi L Rev at 722 (cited in note 3).
See Black, 124 U Pa L Rev at 1157 (cited in note 44).
LaCroix, Ideological Origins at 158–66 (cited in note 1).
Id at 160.
See id at 171.
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even skeptics such as Thomas Jefferson, shared the sense that an initial
allocation of power between the states and the general government was
essential to avoiding the old imperium in imperio problem.54 The provisions
of Article I, § 10, all of which were addressed to the state legislatures, were
a first step in this project. But the ultimate weapon against messy overlap
between state and federal levels of government was to be the courts.55 In
response to Madison’s negative, Jefferson argued for “an appeal from the
state judicature to a federal court, in all cases where the act of
Confederation controled the question.” Would not a judicial mechanism
such as this, he inquired, “be as effectual a remedy, & exactly
commensurate to the defect?”56
Just as many critics of imperial regulation had argued in the 1760s, the
key theoretical move was not to find a new unitary sovereign but to
conceive that it was possible—even desirable—for one polity to contain
multiple sovereigns, as long as each was prescribed a specific regulatory
domain in which to exercise its power. In the 1760s, the distinction between
internal and external regulation was one important mode by which the
colonists began to think through subject-matter-based authority. The
contribution of the debates in the 1780s was to support this newly
legitimized structure of legislative multiplicity with a set of institutions
designed to police the boundaries between the power of the states and that
of the general government. These institutions were, of course, courts in
general (all of which were bound by the Supremacy Clause), and federal
courts in particular (as envisioned by the Federalists and enacted by the
First Congress in the Judiciary Act of 178957). The Constitution drew the
lines of authority and also established the institutions that would monitor
these boundaries in perpetuity.58
Wood resists the notion that the defeat of Madison’s negative was a
turning point in the development of federalism, as well as the related idea
that the defeat of the negative had anything to do with the eventual adoption
of judicial review of state courts’ decisions or state legislatures’ acts. Again,
Wood insists that the Founders’ experience of popular sovereignty was the
central—indeed, the only—force motivating their decisions during the
drafting and ratification of the Constitution. He reads the argument for
judicial review offered in Federalist 78 as Hamilton “simply trying to

54

See id at 179–213.
See LaCroix, Ideological Origins at 163 (cited in note 1).
56 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (June 20, 1787), reprinted in Robert A.
Rutland, et al, eds, 10 The Papers of James Madison 63, 64 (Chicago 1977).
57 1 Stat 73.
58 See LaCroix, Ideological Origins at 165 (cited in note 1).
55
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establish and enhance the independence and authority of the judiciary
against the mistrusted state legislatures.”59
This interpretation of Federalist 78 demonstrates the limits of an
approach that reads the Founding period entirely, and only, through the lens
of popular sovereignty. Hamilton justified judicial review as the mechanism
by which the courts would serve as “an intermediate body between the
people and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter
within the limits assigned to their authority.”60 Institutions mattered to
Hamilton. The point of Federalist 78 was not only to establish the
legitimacy of the courts by linking them to the people but also to vest the
judiciary with ultimate guardianship of the Constitution.
In making this argument, Hamilton offered a theoretical justification
not only for judicial review, but also for a view of judicial supremacy that
associated courts—in particular, the Supreme Court—with the Constitution
itself.61 Federalist 78 explicitly linked the judiciary with the people, but the
larger connection that Hamilton made was the one between the judiciary
and the Constitution as the preeminent source of higher law. “No legislative
act [ ] contrary to the constitution can be valid,” Hamilton wrote.62 Such a
principle supposes that
where the will of the legislature declared in its statutes, stands in
opposition to that of the people declared in the constitution, the judges
ought to be governed by the latter, rather than the former. They ought
to regulate their decisions by the fundamental laws, rather than by
those which are not fundamental.63
To be sure, he went on to say that to argue otherwise would be “to affirm
. . . that the representatives of the people are superior to the people
themselves.”64 The people and the Constitution were deeply intertwined. But
the invocation of the Constitution as both a source of governmental power
and as the government itself was new in the 1780s and was therefore not
part of the seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century colonial experience
that Wood argues was the fount of American federalism.
Hamilton’s vision of judicial review thus aimed to solve the puzzle
that had tormented James Otis: Were there any limits to the power of an

59

Wood, 78 U Chi L Rev at 731 (cited in note 3).
Federalist 78 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 521, 525 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed).
61 Contemporary observers as well as modern scholars have read Federalist 78 as making the case
for judicial supremacy. See, for example, Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the
Making of the Constitution 186 (Vintage 1996) (noting Anti-Federalists’ critique of Federalist 78 as
giving the federal judiciary “a final power of interpreting the meaning of the Constitution and the
laws”).
62 Federalist 78 (Hamilton) at 524 (cited in note 60).
63 Id at 525.
64 Id at 524.
60
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omnipotent legislature? If so, those limits must come from a higher source
of law. Otis had worked through the arguments and come to the ambiguous
conclusion that although Parliament’s authority must be limited by natural
law (it could not make 2 plus 2 equal 5), it was not clear what, if any,
institution could enforce these limits against the legislature. Hamilton
provided a theoretical and practical solution to this problem: the legislature
was not sovereign; the people were sovereign. And the institution that would
enact this amorphous popular sovereignty was the judiciary. Popular
sovereignty was certainly important to Hamilton, but the idea of the
Constitution as higher law in and of itself was beginning to take on
normative power.65 While Otis had struggled to articulate the means by
which “God and nature” could provide real limits on Parliament, rather than
simply leaving its subjects waiting in the hope that Parliament would
suddenly be “convinced of [its] mistake,”66 Hamilton gave the ethereal
Constitution concrete force by vesting the courts with the institutional
responsibility for guarding and carrying out the Constitution in the here and
now. Courts, therefore, would police the actions of the legislatures to ensure
that fleeting majorities could not damage the perpetual Constitution. By
standing in for the Constitution, courts would also provide a way out of the
head-to-head conflict between legislatures that had for decades elicited
charges of imperium in imperio. The Constitution was understood to
embody the people, but for Hamilton and his fellow Federalists, it was also
a source of law and a roadmap for dividing governmental authority.
I therefore agree with what many scholars have long taken to be one of
the central arguments in Wood’s Creation of the American Republic: that
the shift from legislative to popular sovereignty around 1787–1789, as
described in Federalist 78, helped Americans finally to break free of their
long-established fears of imperium in imperio.67 But I do not agree with the
Wood of this review, insofar as he insists that Federalist 78 was nothing
more than a restatement of a decades-old commitment to “bottom up”
political authority. British North Americans certainly had experimented
with local autonomy for decades, but they had also conducted a long
struggle to reconcile their commitment to localism with their mutually
incompatible beliefs in legislative sovereignty and higher-law limits on
legislatures. With the negative, Madison attempted to graft a key element of
imperial practice—hierarchical legislative review—onto the two-tiered
structure of the Confederation. Madison’s proposal thus echoed the debates
65 Consider Morton J. Horwitz, A Historiography of the People Themselves and Popular
Constitutionalism, 81 Chi Kent L Rev 813, 817 (2006) (noting that for both Wood and Bernard Bailyn,
“the emergence of the idea of a Constitution as embodying fundamental law is one of the paramount
achievements of the American Revolution”).
66 Otis, Rights of the British Colonies at 446 (cited in note 32).
67 Wood, Creation of the American Republic at 372–89 (cited in note 4).
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of the 1760s and 1770s, which focused exclusively on the relationship
between legislatures (there, the colonial assemblies and Parliament; in the
1780s, the state legislatures and Congress). The delegates’ rejection of the
negative, followed immediately by their taking up a draft provision
directing that “the Judiciaries of the several States” would be “bound” by
“the supreme law” of the United States, signaled that the institutional focus
of federal thought was shifting from legislatures to courts.68
This is not to say, however, that judicial review was entirely novel in
the 1780s. On the contrary: a large body of scholarship dating from the
early twentieth century, and recently updated with nuanced additions to the
historiography, makes clear that judicial review—meaning the ability of
courts to pass on the validity of statutes—was a long-established practice in
English and Anglo-American law.69 Wood’s claim that judicial review did
not emerge until decades after the Founding echoes an old strain of
Marbury-worship in constitutional law scholarship, but it is simply not
supported by the evidence, and modern historiography has decidedly
rejected this view.70 Many decades before Marbury v Madison71 and Fletcher
v Peck72 established the Supreme Court’s power to invalidate acts of
Congress and state laws, Anglo-American lawyers and statesmen believed
that courts had the power to strike down—or, in more modest terms, to
recognize the voidness of—laws that did not conform to the fundamental
law of the land. As Philip Hamburger observes, “Long before Americans
declared their independence, many English lawyers understood that the law
made by the people, their ‘constitution,’ was of higher authority and
68 Wood notes that this draft version of what became the Supremacy Clause was introduced by
Luther Martin, who opposed the creation of inferior federal courts. Wood seems to intend this observation
as evidence that Martin’s proposal could not possibly have been made with judicial review in mind. As I
demonstrate in Chapter 6 and in a forthcoming article, however, opponents of federal courts frequently
embraced the requirement that state court judges be “bound” by federal law because the ambiguity of the
phrase arguably left some authority in the hands of state judges. See LaCroix, Ideological Origins at 196
(cited in note 1). See also Alison L. LaCroix, Federalists, Federalism, and Federal Jurisdiction, 30 L &
Hist Rev *5–6 (forthcoming 2012), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1558612 (visited Apr 16, 2011).
69 See Smith, Appeals to the Privy Council at 523–52 (cited in note 29); Julius Goebel Jr,
1 History of the Supreme Court of the United States: Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801 50
(Macmillan 2d ed 1971); William E. Nelson, Changing Conceptions of Judicial Review: The Evolution
of Constitutional Theory in the States, 1790–1860, 120 U Pa L Rev 1166, 1166–68 (1972); Hulsebosch,
Constituting Empire at 28–31 (cited in note 29); Bilder, The Transatlantic Constitution at 186–87 (cited
in note 29); Hamburger, Law and Judicial Duty at 179 (cited in note 29). See generally Jack N. Rakove,
The Origins of Judicial Review: A Plea for New Contexts, 49 Stan L Rev 1031 (1997).
70 Compare Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 1 (Yale 2d ed 1986) (asserting
that the Constitution solidified the duties of Congress and the President but that Chief Justice John
Marshall’s opinion in Marbury v Madison “summoned [the judiciary] up out of the constitutional
vapors”), with Rakove, 49 Stan L Rev at 1036 (cited in note 69) (criticizing Bickel’s “dramatic theory of
the Pallas-Athena birth of judicial review” by rooting judicial review in Article VI and citing its long
historical record).
71 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
72 10 US (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).

File: LaCroix

750

Created on: 6/10/2011 10:03:00 AM

The University of Chicago Law Review

Last Printed: 6/10/2011 10:06:00 AM

[78:733

obligation than other human law in their jurisdiction.”73 Although the idea
remained vague, it was certainly familiar to many educated British North
Americans, especially those present at the Constitutional Convention.74
As the debate over Madison’s negative demonstrates, the primary
focus of the discussion about judicial review in the 1780s was the Supreme
Court’s review of state legislative acts and state court decisions, not review
of acts of Congress. The delegates’ rejection of the negative, followed later
that day by their adoption of the draft Supremacy Clause, marked a decisive
shift from decades-long debates about which legislature was supreme to a
reliance on courts as referees charged with ensuring that each legislature
stayed within its proper subject-matter domain. “From this point on,” Larry
D. Kramer observes, “the delegates assumed the existence of judicial
review over state laws in their deliberations.”75 It is therefore difficult to
exaggerate the importance of the judiciary for the creation of American
federalism. Indeed, in the early nineteenth century, the jurisdiction of the
federal courts, and the review of state court decisions by the Supreme
Court, became a major battleground for competing views of federalism.76
Wood’s insistence on popular sovereignty as the single causal mechanism
for the development of federalism is misguided. As Federalist 78
demonstrates, popular sovereignty was a necessary, but not a sufficient,
condition for judicial review.77 The move to judicial review, and the
adoption of the Supremacy Clause, Article III, and § 8 and § 10 of Article I,
was the key moment in which Americans translated multiplicity into
operative legal categories.
III. THEORY
Perhaps even more troubling than the tone and the substantive
arguments in Wood’s review is his view of the role of ideas in history and

73 Hamburger, Law and Judicial Duty at 17 (cited in note 29). Hamburger continues: “Not merely
the arrangement of government, this sort of constitution was the most fundamental part of the law of the
land, and although many men questioned its application to Parliament, many others understood it to
limit Parliament and thus to render any unconstitutional government act unlawful and void.” Id.
74 The assumption that courts could invalidate legislation was evident in Gouverneur Morris’s
statement at the convention that “[a] law that ought to be negatived will be set aside in the Judiciary
departmt. and if that security should fail; may be repealed by a Nationl. law.” Max Farrand, ed, 2 The
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 28 (Yale rev ed 1934).
75 Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review 75
(Oxford 2004) (positing that Luther Martin introduced the Supremacy Clause following defeat of
Madison’s negative because, as a proponent of states’ rights, he wanted to gain support for defeating the
negative by offering a palatable alternative).
76 See generally LaCroix, Federalists, Federalism, and Federal Jurisdiction (cited in note 68).
77 In a system of parliamentary sovereignty, such as Britain’s after the Glorious Revolution,
judicial review of legislative acts was by definition impossible. See Hamburger, Law and Judicial Duty
at 238–39 (cited in note 29) (explaining that judges could not hold acts of Parliament unlawful because
Parliament was, in theory, the highest common law court).
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historiography. Wood creates a stark dichotomy between ideas and
experience. In stating that “these early settlers were experiencing federalism
without any ideological justification whatsoever,” and in relentlessly
creating an opposition between the colonists’ “experience with
governmental multiplicity” on the one hand and the English “idea of
sovereignty” on the other, Wood in essence challenges all historians to
choose either ideas or experience as causal forces.78
Wood charges that I “never make[] clear why ideas were more
important than institutions and the day-to-day political experience of the
colonists.”79 My response is that Wood never explains why we must choose
between the two. In a book titled The Ideological Origins of American
Federalism, one cannot be surprised that the argument does not contain
extensive discussion of economic, cultural, or social explanations for the
emergence of federalism. My book discuses the ideological origins of
American federalism, not the experiential or social origins of American
federalism. Wood, however, seems to believe not only that ideology and
social practices are mutually exclusive categories, but that social practices
are the dominant causal force for historical actors and therefore should be
the dominant explanatory factor for historians.
Let us take the first of Wood’s statements quoted above as an example.
After discussing the Fundamental Orders of Connecticut80 as an instance of
local self-determination in the early colonial years, he concludes, “All of
this reinforced the view that authority was created by the pooling together
of local power from below. In other words, these early settlers were
experiencing federalism without any ideological justification whatsoever.”81
Can Gordon Wood, the chief exponent of the concept of republicanism that
so influenced much of American political and legal historiography in the
late twentieth century, really be saying that “experience” exists as an
entirely distinct and neutral category of analysis, separate from any
suspicious “ideological justification,” and that the presence of any
discernible set of social practices means that ideology was irrelevant?
Surely by now political, intellectual, and legal historians are sophisticated
enough to understand that both social practices and ideology are
important—indeed, that they are related and mutually constitutive
categories, not that social practices are the important base and ideology

78

Wood, 78 U Chi L Rev at 708, 713 (cited in note 3).
Id at 708.
80 Fundamental Orders of Connecticut, 1639, reprinted in Jon L. Wakelyn, ed, 1 America’s
Founding Charters: Primary Documents of Colonial and Revolutionary Era Governance 125, 125
(Greenwood 2006).
81 Wood, 78 U Chi L Rev at 713 (cited in note 3) (emphasis added).
79
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merely superstructure. Yet reading Wood’s review, one wonders whether he
has turned out to be a Beardian after all.82
The specifics of his claim seem to be as follows: The early colonists’
belief in their own political and constitutional capacity meant that upon
arrival in the New World, they were able immediately to set about
organizing their own towns and counties, and then colonies and
confederations of colonies. From the early decades of the seventeenth
century, local political authority was part of everyday life for North
American settlers from the British Isles; we know this because they did in
fact leave behind documents in which they created towns, counties,
colonies, and confederations. Historians do not need to look much further
than these documents. In fact, they should not look any further; they should
simply take the documents as they are and draw from them the only
conclusions that contemporary actors could have drawn: English settlers are
compulsive drafters of fundamental political and legal writings; some towns
to the north of Long Island Sound have joined themselves into the colony of
Connecticut; local units of government are powerful.
With this rich experience of local self-determination—which, again,
my book does not dispute but takes as a given—to draw from, the colonists
never needed any sort of fancy ideology to justify what they were up to.
They simply acted, and their actions were all the evidence we need of what
their motivating ideas were. Accounts that emphasize ideas, and that term
some ideas “ideologies” when they take on wider political and legal force,
and when they both grow out of a particular set of political and legal
conditions and feed back into politics and law to reframe the landscape of
possibilities, are anathema to the view that Wood puts forth.
The trouble with such a view is that it suggests that the people who
were actually having these experiences—colonists in Hartford who helped
to draft the Fundamental Orders of Connecticut, passengers aboard the
Mayflower who decided not to be deterred by the mismatch between their
patent and the location of their landfall—were not thinking about them. The
early settlers who, Wood argues, experienced federalism without any
ideological justification might have been just mimetic automatons acting on
the premise that local units of government are powerful. But Wood is not
playing fair here. In order for the practice of localism to become the idea of
popular sovereignty that bears so much weight in his interpretation,

82 See generally Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United
States (Transaction 1988) (originally published 1913) (arguing that economic rather than ideological
factors provided the motivating force behind the drafting and ratification of the Constitution). See also
Forrest McDonald, Book Review, Colliding with the Past, 25 Rev Am Hist 13, 13–14 (1997) (“To
Beard, the establishment of the Constitution was something of a counter-revolution, engineered by
affluent but suffering holders of personal as opposed to real property. . . . Its design was to reverse the
radical democratic tendencies the Revolution had unleashed.”).
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contemporary actors must have thought about and attempted to make sense
of their experience. Popular sovereignty is, after all, an idea. To argue
otherwise would make popular sovereignty nothing more than a post hoc
analytical frame conjured by twentieth-century scholars, and neither Wood
nor I believes this to be the case.
Perhaps one reason for Wood’s hostility to the ideological explanation
is simply that it postdates popular sovereignty, which had been present
since the earliest days of colonial settlement and which he views as the
source of late eighteenth-century American politics. But of course the fact
that local autonomy was present from the beginning does not mean that it
never changed, much less that federalism was there from the beginning. In
order to believe that popular sovereignty was an idea that had meaning for
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Americans, one must take those
historical actors seriously enough to believe that they might have been
capable of organizing their experiences conceptually. Otherwise, we might
as well all be historical materialists, arguing that forces and experiences
beyond individual control were responsible for structuring world-historical
events.83
But that is certainly not what I thought I had learned from the Wood
who wrote The Creation of the American Republic, Part One of which is
titled “The Ideology of Revolution.”84 Indeed, the binary view of the
distinction between ideas and experience that Wood’s review adopts
contradicts some of his own most powerful work. Throughout the review,
he suggests that the colonial experience of local autonomy was in some
important sense “real,” while the ideology of multiple authority that I posit
was at most an emanation from that reality and not in any important sense
real on its own terms. I know I am not alone in having been taught in
graduate school that Wood, along with Bernard Bailyn, brought the study of
ideas back to American political history after the profession’s long dalliance
with the materialist and determinist explanations of scholars such as
Charles Beard.
In a 1966 article, Wood offered a powerful critique of early to midtwentieth-century Progressive historians such as Beard and Carl Becker,
whom he argued had “absorb[ed] the diffused thinking of Marx and Freud
and the assumptions of behaviorist psychology” and thus “sought to explain
the Revolution and the formation of the Constitution in terms of socioeconomic relationships and interests rather than in terms of ideas.”85 The
83 See generally Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (Kerr 1913) (N.I.
Stone, trans) (originally published 1859); Edwin R.A. Seligman, The Economic Interpretation of History
(Gordian 1967) (originally published 1902).
84 Wood, The Creation of the American Republic at 7–8 (cited in note 4).
85 Wood, 23 Wm & Mary Q at 7 (cited in note 48). See also Beard, An Economic Interpretation of
the Constitution at 7 (cited in note 82); Carl Lotus Becker, The History of Political Parties in the Province
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problem with the Progressive historians’ approach was that it treated ideas
as “parcels of thought to be distributed and used where they would do the
most good,” in contrast to the more nuanced views of later scholars such as
Bailyn, who demonstrated “the autonomy of ideas as phenomena, where the
ideas operate, as it were, over the heads of the participants, taking them in
directions no one could have foreseen.”86 According to such a methodology,
Wood wrote, ideas are “more than indicators of motives. They become as
well objects for analysis in and for themselves, historical events in their
own right to be treated as other historical events are treated.”87 For Wood,
one important insight that such an interpretation offered was that the
Progressive historians’ distinction between rhetoric and reality, ideas and
interests, was illusory after all. “[T]he ideas, the rhetoric, of the Americans
was never obscuring but remarkably revealing of their deepest interests and
passions. . . . [T]heir rhetoric was never detached from the social and
political reality; and indeed it becomes the best entry into an understanding
of that reality.”88 One wonders what the author of those words would have
thought of the ideas–experience dichotomy put forth in Wood’s review.
Wood has not only misunderstood the substantive claims of my book,
but he and I have fundamentally different views of the relationship between
ideas and experience, and the associated relationship between law and
society. First, ideas and experience. My argument is premised on the notion
that social practices take on meaning when contemporaries funnel them
through an existing framework of ideas, a process that frequently
fundamentally alters that framework. To adapt a line from David Armitage’s
study of the British Empire, my intention is “not to expose beliefs about”
federalism “as either true or false, but rather to show the ways in which the
constitutive elements of various conceptions” about federalism “arose in the
competitive context of political argument.”89 Ideas and experience,
therefore, should be seen as existing in a relationship of “relative
autonomy.”90 Each is a distinct category, but they are interrelated and
mutually constitutive, such that one cannot be understood without the
of New York, 1760–1776 22 (Wisconsin 1960) (originally published 1909); Carl Becker, The Declaration of
Independence: A Study in the History of Political Ideas 128–34 (Harcourt, Brace 1922).
86 Wood, 23 Wm & Mary Q at 8–10, 23 (cited in note 48).
87 Id at 21.
88 Id at 31 (arguing that the colonists’ “repeated overstatements”—such as “incessant talk of
‘tyranny,’” “obsession with ‘virtue,’” and “devotion to ‘liberty’”—were ideas of “real personal and
social significance” based in their own experience rather than mere propaganda).
89 David Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire 5 (Cambridge 2000).
90 See Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 Stan L Rev 57, 100–01 (1984) (“[Legal
doctrines] can’t be explained completely by reference to external political/social/economic factors. To some
extent they are independent variables in social experience and therefore they require study elaborating their
peculiar internal structures.”). See also Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780–
1860 xiii (Harvard 1977) (arguing that “legal consciousness in any particular period is not simply the sum
of those contemporary social forces that impinge upon law”).
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other—either by contemporaries or by later historians looking back at a
given moment.
This view has important consequences for the study of legal and
constitutional thought. As Morton Horwitz observes, “no historian of law
can fail to recognize that legal consciousness in any particular period is not
simply the sum of those contemporary social forces that impinge upon law.
Law is autonomous to the extent that ideas are autonomous, at least in the
short run.”91 Wood’s distinction between experience and ideas, and his
disdain for ideological explanations, is simply untenable when applied to
the study of the history of a legal concept such as federalism. Unless Wood
did not really mean it when he stated that federalism is “a historically
created conception that changed through time as circumstances changed”
rather than a “transcendent idea standing outside of time and place,”92 it is
difficult to understand his resistance to an ideological history—any
ideological history, it would seem—of federalism. Federalism was the
subject of a great deal of thought and discussion by lawyers, which may or
may not have reflected social practice. Once we accept the relative
autonomy of law, however, the difficulties with Wood’s “mirror theory” of
law as merely the reflection of experience—and therefore of federalism as
nothing more than the logical outcome of local political autonomy—
become evident.93 It is not a meaningful critique to say that the ideological
account of federalism’s origins does not match the experiential account.
While ideas and experience, and law and social practice, are deeply
interrelated, they are not the same thing. In contrast to the mirror theory of
law, the view of experience and ideas as mutually constitutive recognizes
that change in law and change in social practice can and do take place at
different rates. The widespread political decentralization that characterized
early colonial America did not create a reality that law simply followed.
Legal thought drew from a variety of sources and influences, and as James
Otis’s struggle illustrates, the intellectual path from local legislative
authority to the constitutionalization of federal law as the supreme law of
the land, binding on state judicial officers, was difficult to navigate.
CONCLUSION
In his review, Wood sets forth more clearly than he has elsewhere his
view of the relationship between republicanism and federalism. For Wood,
republicanism—defined above all as popular sovereignty—was the
proximate cause of the Revolution and the drafting and ratification of the

91

Horwitz, Transformation of American Law at xiii (cited in note 90).
Wood, 78 U Chi L Rev at 708 (cited in note 3).
93 See William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (II): The Logic of Legal Transplants, 43 Am J
Comp L 489, 491–96, 508 (1995) (describing and critiquing “mirror theories of law”).
92
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Constitution. On this view, the changes in late eighteenth-century American
political and legal theory can be explained only and entirely by republican
ideology, which in his review is presented as the sum of the colonists’
decades-long experience of local autonomy. Federalism was simply an
outgrowth of this ideology, an application of the general principle of
popular sovereignty to the specific problem of the relationship between the
states and the general government.
My book is a history of the shift from multiplicity as a problematic but
deeply felt commitment of British North American legal thought to
federalism as the foundational constitutional value behind a new legal and
political regime. To be sure, the new regime was a republic, and it therefore
relied on republican ideas, among them popular sovereignty. But the new
regime was also federal, and it therefore emerged from a diffuse array of
responses, both theoretical and experiential, to unitary sovereignty.
Federalism was not just the result of Americans finally internalizing the fear
of imperium in imperio and finding the language to describe their
homegrown remedy for it. Federalism was a rejection of that specter based
on both their experience with local government and their theory that
sovereignty could be divided along subject-matter lines, lines that would in
turn be policed by an institution with a special mandate to monitor these
boundaries.
If Wood charges me with originality because I view American
federalism as distinct from republicanism, I am happy to accept the
compliment.

Readers with comments may address them to:
Professor Alison L. LaCroix
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
lacroix@uchicago.edu

The University of Chicago Law School
Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series
For a listing of papers 1–300 please go to http://www.law.uchicago.edu/publications/papers/publiclaw.

300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

Anu Bradford, When the WTO Works, and How It Fails (March 2010)
Aziz Z. Huq, Modeling Terrorist Radicalization (March 2010)
Adam M. Samaha, On Law’s Tiebreakers (March 2010)
Brian Leiter, The Radicalism of Legal Positivism (March 2010)
Lee Anne Fennell, Unbundling Risk (April 2010)
Aziz Z. Huq, What Good Is Habeas? (April 2010)
Aziz Z. Huq, Easterbrook on Academic Freedom (April 2010)
Jonathan S. Masur and Jonathan Remy Nash, The Institutional Dynamics of Transition
Relief (April 2010)
Alison L. LaCroix, Temporal Imperialism (May 2010)
Lior J. Strahilevitz, Reunifying Privacy Law (May 2010)
Lee Fennell, Possession Puzzles (June 2010)
Jonathan S. Masur, Booker Reconsidered (June 2010)
Mary Anne Case, What Feminists Have to Lose in Same-Sex Marriage Litigation (July
2010)
Mary Anne Case, A Lot to Ask: Review Essay of Martha Nussbaum’s From Disgust to
Humanity: Sexual Orientation and Constitutional Law (July 2010)
Adam M. Samaha, The Story of FCC v. Pacifica Foundation (and Its Second Life)
(August 2010)
Jonathan S. Masur and Eric A. Posner, Climate Regulation and the Limits of Cost-Benefit
Analysis (August 2010)
Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation (August 2010)
Bernard E. Harcourt and Tracey L. Meares, Randomization and the Fourth Amendment
(August 2010)
Adam M. Samaha, Low Stakes and Constitutional Interpretation (August 2010)
Brian Leiter, The Demarcation Problem in Jurisprudence: A New Case for Skepticism
(August 2010)
Brian Leiter, Legal Formalism and Legal Realism: What Is the Issue? (August 2010)
John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, and Jonathan S. Masur, Retribution and the
Experience of Punishment (September 2010)
Lior Strahilevitz, Pseudonymous Litigation (September 2010)
Bernard E. Harcourt, Risk As a Proxy for Race (September 2010)
Christopher R. Berry and Jacob E. Gersen, Voters, Non-Voters, and the Implications of
Election Timing for Public Policy, September 2010
Lee Anne Fennell, Willpower Taxes, October 2010
Christopher R. Berry and Jacob E. Gersen, Agency Design and Distributive Politics,
October 2010
Eric A. Posner, The Constitution of the Roman Republic: A Political Economy
Perspective, November 2010
Tom Ginsburg, James Melton and Zachary Elkins, On the Evasion of Executive Term
Limits, November 2010
Rosalind Dixon and Eric A. Posner, The Limits of Constitutional Convergence,
November 2010
Tom Ginsburg, Constitutional Specificity, Unwritten Understandings and Constitutional
Agreement, November 2010.

331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.

340.
341.

342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.

356.

Tom Ginsburg, Written Constitutions and the Administrative State: On the Constitutional
Character of Administrative Law, November 2010
Rosalind Dixon, Amending Constituting Identity, December 2010
Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Demystifying Schmitt, January 2011
Jonathan S. Masur, Regulating Patents, January 2011
Bernard E. Harcourt, Reducing Mass Incarceration: Lessons from the
Deinstitutionalization of Mental Hospitals in the 1960s, January 2011
Jacob E. Gersen, Designing Agencies, January 201l
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Tom R. Tyler, and Aziz Z. Huq, American Policing at a
Crossroads, February 2011
Aziz Z. Huq, The Signaling Function of Religious Speech in Domestic Counterterrorism,
February 2011
Aziz Z. Huq, Tom R. Tyler, and Stephen J. Schulhofer, Why Does the Public Cooperate
with Law Enforcement? The Influence of the Purposes and Targets of Policing, February
2011
Aziz Z. Huq, Tom R. Tyler, and Stephen J. Schulhofer, Mechanisms for Eliciting
Cooperation in Counter-Terrorism Policing: Evidence from the United Kingdom
Bernard E. Harcourt, Making Willing Bodies: Manufacturing Consent among Prisoners
and Soldiers, Creating Human Subjects, Patriots, and Everyday Citizens—The University
of Chicago Malaria Experiments on Prisoners at Stateville Penitentiary, February 2011
Jonathan S. Masur, Patent Liability Rules as Search Rules, February 2011
Brian Leiter, The Law of Religious Liberty in a Tolerant Society, March 2011
Rosalind Dixon, Updating Constitutional Rules, March 2011
Rosalind Dixon and Martha Nussbaum, Abortion, Dignity and a Capabilities Approach,
March 2011
Rosalind Dixon and Richard Holden, Constitutional Amendment Rules: The
Denominator Problem, May 2011
Rosalind Dixon, Constitutional Amendment Rules: A Comparative Perspective, May
2011
Rosalind Dixon, Weak-Form Judicial Review and American Exceptionalism, May 2011
Rosalind Dixon, Transnational Constitutionalism and Unconstitutional Constitutional
Amendments, May 2011
Adam B. Cox and Richard T. Holden, Reconsidering Racial and Partisan
Gerrymandering, May 2011
Brian Leiter, The Circumstances of Civility, May 2011
Brian Leiter, Naturalized Jurisprucence and American Legal Realism Revisited, May
2011
Lee Anne Fennell, Property and Precaution, June 2011
Alon Harel and Ariel Porat, Commensurability and Agency: Two Yet-to-Be-Met
Challenges for Law and Economics, June 2011
Bernard E. Harcourt, Radical Throught from Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, through
Foucault, to the Present: Comments on Steven Lukes’ “In Defense of False
Consciousness,” June 2011
Alison L. LaCroix, Rhetoric and Reality in Early American Legal History: A Reply to
Gordon Wood, July 2011

